Plato's Republic

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Beuk I  Part 2

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Cephalus - SOCRATES - POLEMARCHUS

"Absolutely spot on, Socrates, if Simonides is tae be believed," says Polemarchus jumpin in.

"I wid be feart that I hae tae gang noo," says Cephalus, "for I hae tae luik efter the sacrifices, and I leave the argument tae Polemarchus and the rest o' ye."

"Isnae Polemarchus yer heir?" says I.

"Aye, tae be sure," he says, and gaed awa lauchin tae the sacrifices.

SOCRATES - POLEMARCHUS

"Tell me then, O heir o' the argument," says I, "whit did Simonides say, and whit wey dae ye think he wis richt, aboot justice?"

"He said that repayin a debt is juist, and it seems tae me that he's richt."

"I wid be sorry tae hae ony doots aboot the word o' sic a wise and inspired fella," says I, "but his meanin, though it micht be clear tae ye, is the opposite o' clear tae me. For he certainly disnae mean, as we were sayin afore, that I ought tae return a deposit o' wappens or onything else tae yin wha asks for it whan he's no in his richt senses; an yet a deposit cannae be refused bein a debt."

True.

Then whan the person wha asks me for it isnae in their richt mind I am by nae means tae gie it back?

Absolutely no.

Whan Simonides said that the repayin a debt wis justice, he didnae mean tae include that case?

Och no, definitely no; for he thinks that a pal should aye dae guid tae a pal and never dae them harm.

Ye mean that returnin a deposit o' gowd that wid cause skaith (harm) tae the fella receivin it, if the twa o' ye are freinds, isnae the repayment o' a debt - that's whit ye wid imagine him tae say?

Aye, that's it.

An are enemies aa meant tae get back whit we owe them?

Tae be sure, he says, "they are tae get back whit we owe them, and an enemy, as I tak it, owes tae an enemy that which is richt or proper tae him - that is tae say, ill (evil)."

Simonides, then, efter the wey o' poets, wid seem tae hae spoken in riddles aboot the nature o' justice; for he really meant tae say that justice is the givin tae each fella what is richt for them, and this he cried a debt.

That maun hae been his meanin, he says.

Weel, says I, "and if we askit him whit richt or proper thing is gien bi medicin, and tae wha, whit answer dae ye think that he wid gie tae us?"

He wid surely answer that medicin gies drugs and meat and drink tae fowk's bodies.

An whit richt or proper thing is gien bi cookery, and tae whit?

Seasonin tae food.

An whit is that which justice gies, and tae wha?

If, Socrates, we are tae be guided at aw bi the analogy o' the previous cases, then justice is the airt that gies guid tae freinds and ill tae enemies.

That's his meanin then?

I think so.

An wha is best able tae dae guid tae his freinds and ill tae his enemies whan they are sick?

The doctor.

Or whan they are on a voyage, in the perils o' the sea?

The pilot.

An in whit wey o' doin things or wi an ee on whit ootcome is the juist fella maist able tae hurt his enemy and dae guid tae his freinds?

In gaun tae war wi yin and in makin alliances wi the ither.

But whan a fella is hale and hearty, ma dear Polemarchus, there's nae need o' a doctor?

No.

An he wha isnae on a voyage has nae need o' a pilot?

No.

Then in time o' peace justice will be o' nae use?

I widnae dream o' thinkin that.

Ye think that justice micht be o' some use in peacetime as weel as in war?

Aye.

Like fermin for gettin haud o' grain?

Aye.

Or like shoemakin for gettin haud o' shuin - that's whit ye mean?

Aye.

An whit similar uiss or pouer o' gettin things dis justice hae in time o' peace?

In screeds (contracts), Socrates, justice is useful.

An bi screeds ye mean pairtnerships?

Exactly.

But is the juist fella or the skilfu' player a mair uissfu' and better pairtner at a game o' draughts?

The skilfu' player.

An in the layin o' bricks and stanes is the juist fella a mair uissfu' or better pairtner than the biggar?

Quite the opposite.

Then in whit wey o' pairtnership is the juist fella a better pairtner than the harp-player, as in playin the harp the harp-player is certainly a better pairtner than the juist fella?

In a siller pairtnership.

Aye, Polemarchus, but surely no in the uiss o' siller; for ye widnae want a juist fella tae be yer counsellor for buyin or sellin a horse; a fella wha kens aboot horses wid be better for that, wid he no?

Tae be sure.

An whan ye want tae buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot wid be better?

True.

Then whit is that joint uiss o' siller or gowd in whilk the juist fella is tae be preferred?

Whan ye want a deposit tae be kept safely.

Ye mean whan siller isnae wantit, but juist alloued tae lie?

Exactly.

That is tae say, justice is useful whan siller is useless?

That's the wey it seems.

An whan ye want tae keep a prunin-hook safe, then justice is useful tae the single person and tae the state; but whan ye want tae uiss it, then the airt o' the vine-dresser?

Clearly.

An whan ye want tae keep a shield or a lyre, and no tae uiss them, ye wid say that justice is useful; but whan ye want tae uiss them, then the airt o' the sodger or o' the musician?

Certainly.

An sae o' aw the ither things; --justice is useful whan they are useless, and useless whan they are useful?

That's whit it seems like.

Then justice isnae that muckle use. But lat's consider this further point: Isnae he wha can best land a punch in a boxin match or in ony wey o' fechtin best able tae dodge a punch?

Certainly.

An he wha is maist skilfu' in preventin or escapin frae a disease is best able tae gie it tae somebody else?

True.

An he is the best guard o' a camp wha is best able tae sneak up on the enemy?

Certainly.

Then he wha is a guid keeper o' onything is an aa a guid thief?

That, I suppose, is whit it seems like.

Then if the juist fella is guid at keepin siller, he is guid at stealin it.

That's whit the argument seems tae be sayin.

Then efter aw the juist fella has turned oot tae be a thief. An this is a lesson which I wid expect ye maun hae gotten oot o' Homer; for he, speakin o' Autolycus, the grandfaither o' Odysseus on his mither's side, wha is a favourite o' his, says that

He wis excellent abune aw men in theft and perjury. An sae, you and Homer and Simonides aa agree that justice is an airt o' theft; tae be practised however 'for the guid o' freinds and for the harm o' enemies,' --that wis whit ye were sayin?

No, certainly no that, though I dinnae noo ken whit I did say; but I still haud on tae the last words.

Weel, there's anither question: Bi freinds and enemies dae we mean thae wha are sae really, or juist seem tae be sae?

Surely, he says, a fella can be expected tae like thae wha he thinks are guid, and tae hate thae wha he thinks are evil.

Aye, but disnae fowk often mak mistakes aboot guid and evil: mony wha arenae guid seem sae, and the opposite is true an aw?

That's true.

Then tae them the guid will be enemies and the evil will be their freinds?  True.

An in that case they wid be richt in doin guid tae the evil and ill tae the guid?

Clearly.

But the guid are juist and widnae dae an injustice?

True.

Then accordin tae yer argument it is juist tae skaith thae wha dae nae wrang?

Naw, Socrates; that teachin is immoral.

Then I suppose that we ocht tae dae guid tae the juist and harm tae the unjust?

I like that better.

But see the consequence: --Monay a fella wha is ignorant o' human nature has freinds wha are bad freinds, and in that case he ocht tae dae harm tae them; and he has guid enemies wha he ocht tae benefit; but, if sae, we wid be sayin the very opposite o' that which we said wis the meanin o' Simonides.

Very true, he says, "and I think that we wid be better tae richt an error that we seem tae hae faun oorsels intae wi oor uiss o' the words 'friend' and 'enemy'."

Whit wis the error, Polemarchus? I askit.

We assumed that he is a friend wha seems tae be or wha is thocht guid.

An hoo is the error tae be correctit?

We sould say instead that he is a friend wha is, as weel as seems, guid; and that he wha seems only, and isnae guid, juist seems tae be and isnae a friend; and o' an enemy the same can be said.

Ye wid argue that the guid are oor freinds and the bad oor enemies?

Aye.

An instead o' sayin simply as we did at first, that it is juist tae dae guid tae oor freinds and harm tae oor enemies, we sould say further: It is juist tae dae guid tae oor freinds whan they are guid and harm tae oor enemies whan they are evil?

Aye, that seems tae me tae be the truth.

But sould the juist fella skaith onybody at aw?

Undoubtedly he sould skaith thae wha are baith wicked and his enemies.

Whan hoorses are skaithed, are they improved or made waur?

The latter.

Made waur, that is tae say, in the guid qualities o' hoorses, no o' dogs?

Aye, o' hoorses.

An dogs are made waur in the guid qualities o' dogs, and no o' hoorses?

Of course.

An willnae men wha are skaithed be made waur in that which is the proper virtue o' man?

Certainly.

An that human virtue is justice?

To be sure.

Then men wha are skaithed are o' necessity made unjust?

That's the outcome.

But can the musician bi his skill mak men unmusical?

Certainly no.

Or the horse-rider bi his skill mak them bad horse-riders?

Impossible.

An can the juist fella bi bein juist mak men unjust, or speakin generally can the guid bi bein virtuous mak them bad?

Absolutely no.

Any mair nor heat can produce cauld?

It cannae.

Or drought moisture?

Clearly no.

Nor can the guid skaith onybody?

Impossible.

An the juist is the guid?

Certainly.

Then tae skaith a friend or onybody else isnae the act o' a juist man, but o' the opposite, wha is the unjust?

I think that whit ye say is quite true, Socrates.

Then if a fella says that justice consists in the repayment o' debts, and that guid is the debt which a man owes tae his freinds, and evil the debt which he owes tae his enemies, --tae say this isnae wise; for it isnae true, if, as has been clearly shown, the skaithin o' anither can be in nae case juist.

I agree wi ye, said Polemarchus.

Then you and I are prepared tae tak up airms against onybody wha attributes sic a sayin tae Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or ony ither wise man or seer?

I am quite ready tae fecht at yer side, he said.

Shall I tell ye whae's I believe the sayin tae be?

Whae's?

I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some ither rich and pouerfu' fella, wha had a great opinion o' his ain pouer, wis the first tae say that justice is 'doin guid tae yer freinds and harm tae yer enemies.

Maist true, he says.

Aye, I says; but if this definition o' justice aa breaks doun, whit ither explanation can be offered?

Several times ower the coorse o' the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt tae get the argument intae his ain haunds, an had been pitten doun bi the lave o' the company, wha wantit tae hear the end. But whan Polemarchus an I hid done speakin an there wis a pause, he could nae langer haud his peace; and, gatherin himsel up, he cam at us like a wild beast, seekin tae devour us. We were quite panickit at the sicht o' him.

Socrates - POLEMARCHUS - THRASYMACHUS

He roared oot tae the hale company: Whit fuleishness, Socrates, has tane haud o' ye aw? An why, ye silly billies, dae ye jimp tae yin anither? I say that if ye want tae truly ken whit justice is, ye shuidnae juist ask but answer, and ye shuidnae seek honour for yersel frae the refutation o' an opponent, but hae yer ain answer; for there's mony a yin wha can ask and cannae answer. An noo I will nae hae ye say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this kinna nonsense will no dae for me; I maun hae clearness and accuracy.

I wis panickit at his words, and couldnae look at him withoot trimblin. Indeed I believe that if I hadnae fixed my ee upon him, I wid hae been struck dumb: but whan I saw his fury risin, I looked at him first, and wis therefore able tae reply tae him.

Thrasymachus, I says, wi a quiver, dinnae be hard upon us. Polemarchus an I micht hae been guilty o' a wee mistake in the argument, but I can assure ye that the error wisnae intentional. Gin we were seekin for a bit o' gowd, ye widnae imagine that we were 'jimpin tae yin anither,' and sae tynesin oor chance o' findin it. An why, whan we are seekin for justice, a thing mair precious than mony bits o' gowd, dae ye say that we are weakly yieldin tae yin anither and no doin oor utmost tae get at the truth? Nay, my guid friend, we are maist willin and anxious tae dae sae, but the fact is that we cannae. An if sae, you fowk wha ken aw things shuid hae pity on us and no be angry wi us.

Hoo characteristic o' Socrates! he replied, wi a bitter laugh; --that's yer ironical style! Did I no foresee --hae I no already telt ye, that whitver he wis askit he wid refuse tae answer, and try irony or ony ither wheech, in order that he micht avoid answerin?

Ye are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and weel ken that if ye ask a person whit numbers mak up twal, takin care tae forbid him wha ye ask frae answerin twice sax, or three times fower, or sax times twa, or fower times three, 'for this kinna nonsense will no dae for me,' --then obviously, that's yer wey o' pittin the question, nae yin can answer ye. But suppose that he were tae retort, 'Thrasymachus, whit dae ye mean? If yin o' these numbers which ye forbyde be the true answer tae the question, am I falsely tae say some ither number which isnae the richt yin? --is that yer meanin?' -Hoo wid ye answer him?

Juist as if the twa cases were at aw alike! he said.

Why shuid they no be? I replied; and even if they arenae, but juist appear tae be sae tae the person wha is askit, ocht he no tae say whit he thinks, whether you and I forbyde him or no?

I presume then that you are gaun tae mak yin o' the forbydden answers?

I dare say that I micht, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve o' ony o' them.

But whit if I gie ye an answer aboot justice ither and better than ony o' these? he said, Than whit dae ye deserve tae hae dune tae ye?

Dune tae me! --as befits the ignorant, I maun learn frae the wise --that is whit I deserve tae hae dune tae me.

What, and nae siller! A braw notion that!

I will pay whan I hae the siller, I replied.

Socrates - THRASYMACHUS - GLAUCON

But ye huv siller, Socrates, says Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under nae anxiety aboot siller, for we will aa mak a contribution for Socrates.

Aye, he replied, and then Socrates will dae as he aye dis -- refuse tae answer himsel, but tak and pull tae pieces the answer o' some yin else.

Why, my guid friend, I says, hoo can onybody answer wha kens, and says that he kens, juist naething; and wha, even if he has some wee notions o' his ain, is telt bi a man o' authority no tae utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker shuid be some yin like yersel wha professes tae ken and can tell whit he kens. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification o' the company and o' mysel?

Glaucon and the lave o' the company joined in ma request and Thrasymachus, as onybody micht see, wis in reality eager tae speak; for he thocht that he had an excellent answer, and wid distinguish himsel. But at first he widnae gie up insistin on my answerin; at lenth he consented tae begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom o' Socrates; he refuses tae teach himsel, and gangs aboot learnin o' ithers, tae wha he niver even says thank ye.

That I learn o' ithers, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Siller I hae nane, and therefore I pay in praise, which is aw I huv: and hoo ready I am tae praise onybody wha appears tae me tae speak weel ye will very soon fin oot whan ye answer; for I expect that ye will answer weel.

Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is naething else than the interest o' the stronger. An noo why dae ye no praise me? But o course ye winnae.

Let me first understaun ye, I replied. Justice, as ye say, is the interest o' the stronger. Whit, Thrasymachus, is the meanin o' this? Ye cannae mean tae say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eatin o' beef beneficial tae his bodily strength, that tae eat beef is therefore equally for oor guid wha are weaker than he is, and richt and just for us?

That's abominable o' ye, Socrates; ye tak the words in the sense which is maist daein ye harm in the argument.

Not a bit o' it, my guid sir, I said; I am tryin tae understaun them; and I wiss that ye wid be a little clearer.

Weel, he said, huv ye never heard that forms o' government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Aye, I ken.

An the government is the rulin pouer in each state?

Certainly.

An the different forms o' government mak laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, wi a view tae their several interests; and these laws, which are made bi them for their ain interests, are the justice which they deliver tae their subjects, and him wha transgresses them they punish as a breaker o' the law, and unjust. An that's whit I mean whan I say that in aw states there is the same principle o' justice, which is the interest o' the government; and as the government maun be supposed tae hae pouer, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is yin principle o' justice, which is the interest o' the stronger.

Noo I understaun ye, I says; and whether ye are richt or no I will try tae discover. But let me remark, that in definin justice you huv yersel uised the word 'interest' which ye forbad me tae use. It is true, however, that in yer definition the words 'o' the stronger' are added.

A wee bit addition, ye maun alloo, he said.

Great or wee, never mind aboot that: we maun first enquire whether whit ye are sayin is the truth. Noo we are baith agreed that justice is interest o' some sort, but ye go on tae say 'o' the stronger'; aboot this addition I am no sae sure, and maun therefore consider further.

Proceed.

I will; and first tell me, Dae ye admit that it is just or subjects tae obey their rulers?

I dae.

But are the rulers o' states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable tae err?

To be sure, he replied, they are liable tae err.

Then in makin their laws they may sometimes mak them richtly, and sometimes no?

True.

When they mak them richtly, they mak them agreeably tae their interest; when they are mistaken, contrair tae their interest; ye admit that?

Aye.

An the laws which they mak maun be obeyed bi their subjects, --and that is whit ye call justice?

Doubtless.

Then justice, accordin tae yer argument, is no only obedience tae the interest o' the stronger but the reverse?

Whit is that ye are sayin? he asked.

I am only repeatin whit ye are sayin, I believe. But let us consider: Have we no admitted that the rulers may be mistaken aboot their ain interest in whit they command, and also that tae obey them is justice? Hasnae that been admitted?

Yes.

Then ye maun also hae acknowledged justice no tae be for the interest o' the stronger, whan the rulers unintentionally command things tae be done which are tae their ain injury. For if, as ye say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders tae their commands, in that case, O wisest o' men, is there ony escape frae the conclusion that the weaker are commanded tae dae, no whit is for the interest, but whit is for the injury o' the stronger?

Naething could be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

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