Plato's Republic Book 1, Part 4

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Socrates - GLAUCON

"Whit dae ye mean bi that, Socrates?" says Glaucon. "The first twa ways o' gettin paid mak sense, but whit wey can a punishment be a payment? I dinnae understand hoo bein punished is gettin something in return."

"Dae ye mean tae say ye dinnae understand this wey o' gettin somethin in return, the thing that truly motivates the best fowk tae rule? Surely ye ken that ambition and greed are considered, and rightly so, tae be shameful things?"

"Absolutely true."

"An that's why," says I, "money and honour dinnae tempt them; good fowk dinnae want tae come oot and say they expect payment for governin, gettin called mercenaries for it. An neither dae they want tae sneak siller oot o' the public purse and get branded thieves. An since they're no ambitious, they dinnae care aboot gettin honoured. Sae, they must be forced tae dae it, and the fear o' punishment is what makes them serve. An this, I imagine, is why it's considered dishonourable tae be eager tae be in charge instead o' waitin tae be made tae dae it."

"The worst part o' the punishment," I says, "is that if ye refuse tae rule, then ye micht end up bein ruled by someone even waur than yersel. An the fear o' that, I believe, is what makes good fowk take on the job, no because they want tae, but because they hae nae choice. No because they think they'll get any benefit or enjoyment oot o' it, but as a necessity, and because they cannae find anyone better or even as good as themsels tae dae the job. Because it maks sense tae believe that if a hale city wis made up entirely o' good fowk, then avoidin the job o' bein in charge would be jist as big a competition as tryin tae get it is the noo. Then we wid see clear as day that a true ruler isnae meant by nature tae jist look efter themsels, but for everyone they rule. An anyone wha kent this would rather hae someone else dae the job for them than hae the hassle o' daein it themsels."

"I certainly dinnae agree wi Thrasymachus that justice is jist lookin efter the stronger fella's best interests. We can leave that topic for anither time. But whan Thrasymachus says that the life o' an unjust man is better than the life o' a just man, that seems like a far mair serious claim. Whit dae ye think, Glaucon? Wha wis richt in this argument? An whilk kind o' life dae ye prefer?"

"Weel, for my part," says Glaucon, "I think a just life is the better way tae live."

"Did ye hear aw the benefits o' bein unjust that Thrasymachus wis blawin on aboot?"

"Aye, I heard him," says Glaucon, "but he didnae convince me."

"Then should we try and find a wey tae convince him, if we can, that whit he's sayin isnae true?"

"Absolutely," says Glaucon.

"If we jist ging back and forth," I says, "wi' him makin a big speech and us counterin wi' aw the benefits o' bein just, and then him answerin back and us replyin again, we'd need someone tae count up and weigh aw the benefits on each side. And in the end, we'd still need judges tae decide whit it aw means. But if we keep gaun the wey we hae been, jist makin wee agreements wi' each other, then we'll be playin the roles o' judge and jury at the same time."

"That sounds good," says Glaucon.

"An which wey o' daein it wid ye prefer?" I asks.

"The wey ye jist suggested."

"Alright then, Thrasymachus," I says, "let's start at the beginnin again and ye answer ma question. Ye said that bein completely unjust is better than bein completely just?"

Socrates - GLAUCON - THRASYMACHUS

"Aye, that's whit I said, and I gied ye ma reasons why."

"An whit dae ye think aboot thae reasons? Wid ye say that yin o' them is a virtue and the ither is a vice?"

"Absolutely."

"I assume ye wid say that justice is a virtue and injustice is a vice?"

"Whit a ridiculous notion! Especially since I'm sayin that injustice brings benefits and justice disnae."

"Whit else wid ye say then?" I asks.

"The opposite," he says.

"An wid ye say that bein just is a vice?"

"Na, I wid say it's mair like bein a bit o' a daftie."

"Then wid ye say that bein unjust is like bein clever?"

"Na, I wid say it's mair like bein discreet."

"An dae ye think bein unjust makes folk wise and good?"

"Aye," he says, "at least the anes wha can be truly unjust and wha hae the power tae bring hale nations and countries tae heel. Maybe ye thocht I wis talkin aboot wee pickpockets. Even that kind o' job can be beneficial if ye dinnae get caught, although it's nothin compared tae the advantages I wis just speakin aboot."

"I dinnae think I'm misunderstannin ye, Thrasymachus," I says, "but it still amazes me that ye pit injustice in the same category as wisdom and virtue, and put justice at the opposite end o' the spectrum."

"Absolutely, that's exactly whit I believe."

"Weel now," I says, "that's a mair substantial position and harder tae argue against. If ye, like everyone else, agreed that injustice brings benefits but is also a vice and a character flaw, then answerin ye wid be easier. But noo it seems ye consider injustice tae be honourable and strong, and ye gie unjust folk aw the same qualities we gie tae the just, since ye dinnae hesitate tae put injustice in the same category as wisdom and virtue."

"Ye've guessed exactly right," he says.

"Then I definitely shouldnae back oot o' keep gaun wi' this argument, as lang as I think ye're bein serious, Thrasymachus. I believe ye actually mean whit ye're sayin and arenae just havin a laugh at oor expense."

"Maybe I am, maybe I'm no," he says, "but that's no yer concern. Yer job is tae argue against whit I'm sayin."

"Absolutely true," I says, "that's whit I gottae dae. But could ye answer just one mair question for me? Does a just person try and get an advantage over another just person?"

"Och, absolutely no! If they did, they widnae be the simple, harmless fella they are."

"An wid he try and dae mair than is considered juist?"

"Na, he widnae."

"An whit aboot tryin tae get an advantage ower an unjust fella? Wid he see that as bein juist or unjust?"

"He wid think it wis juist, and he wid try and get the upper hand, but he probably widnae be able tae."

"Whether he can or cannae dae it isnae important," I says. "A' I'm askin is whether a just fella, even though he widnae want mair than another just fella, wid he still want and expect tae hae mair than an unjust fella?"

"Aye, he wid."

"An whit aboot the unjust yin? Dis he want mair than the just fella and try and dae things that arenae juist?"

"Absolutely," he says, "because he wants mair than everyone else."

"An the unjust man will strive and fecht tae get mair than another unjust man or dae waur things, jist so he can hae mair than everyone?"

"That's true."

"We can say it this wey then," I says, "the just person disnae want mair than someone who's just like them, but they dae want mair than someone who's unjust. Whereas the unjust person wants mair than everyone, even those who are similar to them."

"That's a perfect way o' puttin it," he says.

"An the unjust person is wise and good, and the just person is neither?"

"Another good point," he says.

"An isnae the unjust person similar tae the wise and good person, and the just person different fae them?"

"Of course," he says, "someone who has a certain kind o' nature is similar tae others who share that nature, and someone who disnae, isnae similar."

"Each o' them," I says, "is similar tae someone who's the same wey?"

"Absolutely," he says.

"Excellent point, Thrasymachus," I says. "Noo, lat's consider the airts: Ye wid agree that yin fella can be a musician and another one disnae ken a thing aboot music?"

"Aye."

"An whilk yin is wise and whilk yin is a daftie?"

"Clearly the musician is wise, and the one who disnae ken music is a daftie."

"An he's good sae far as he's wise, and bad sae far as he's a daftie?"

"Aye."

"An ye wid say the same thing aboot a doctor?"

"Aye."

"An dae ye think, my good friend," I says, "that a musician, whan they're tunin a lute, wid want or expect tae dae it better than another musician, tightenin and loosenin the strings?"

"I dinnae think he wid."

"But he wid want tae dae it better than someone who kens nothin aboot music?"

"Absolutely."

"An whit aboot the doctor? Whan decidin whit food and drink is best, wid they want tae be better than another doctor, or better than someone who disnae ken medicine?"

"They widnae."

"But they wid want tae be better than someone who kens nothin aboot medicine?"

"Aye."

"An whit aboot knowledge and ignorance in general? Do ye think someone who has knowledge would ever want tae choose tae say or dae mair than another person who has knowledge? Wid theynae be mair likely tae say or dae the same thing as someone who kens as much as them, in the same situation?"

"That, I suppose, ye cannae really deny."

"An whit aboot the ignorant fella? Widnae he want tae get mair than either the knowledgeable yin or the ignorant yin?"

"Aye, that likely."

"An the knowledgeable yin is wise?"

"Aye."

"An the wise yin is good?"

"True."

"Then the wise and good fella disnae want tae get mair than someone who's the same wey as them, but they dae want mair than someone who's different and opposite?"

"I suppose so."

"Whereas the bad and ignorant fellae will want tae get mair than both o' them?"

"Aye."

"But didnae we say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust man tries tae get mair than both those who are similar tae him and those who are different? Wisnae that whit ye said?"

"Aye, that was whit I said."

"An ye also said that someone who desires things will not want mair than someone who's similar, but will want mair than someone who's different?"

"Aye."

"Then the just person is similar tae the wise and good person, and the unjust person is similar tae the bad and ignorant person?"

"That's the conclusion we can draw."

"An each o' them is similar tae someone who's the same wey?"

"That wis whit we agreed."

"Then it turns oot that the just person is wise and good, and the unjust person is bad and ignorant."

Thrasymachus made aw these wee agreements, no jist blawin oot the answers like I am, but wi' extreme reluctance. It wis a braw hot summer day, and the sweat wis pourin aff him in waves. An then I saw something I'd never seen afore - Thrasymachus blushin. Since we noo agreed that justice wis virtue and wisdom, and injustice wis vice and ignorance, I moved on tae anither point:

"Weel then, Thrasymachus," I says, "that issue is settled noo. But didnae we also say that injustice wis strong? Mind ye o' that?"

"Aye, I mind," he says, "but dinnae think I approve o' whit ye're sayin or that I dinnae hae an answer. But if I wis tae answer, ye wid be sure tae accuse me o' gaein on a lang speech. Sae either let me hae my say, or if ye prefer tae ask questions, then ask away, and I'll answer 'Very good,' like they dae tae auld wives tellin stories, and I'll jist nod 'Aye' and 'Naw'."

"Certainly no," I says, "if that's no what ye truly believe."

"Aye, I will answer ye," he says, "tae please ye, since ye winnae let me speak properly. What else dae ye want?"

"Naething at all," I says, "and if that's whit ye want tae dae, then I'll ask the questions and ye can answer."

"Carry on then."

"Then I'll repeat the same question I asked afore, so we can keep gaun through this examination o' the relative nature o' justice and injustice. We heard it said that injustice is stronger and mair powerful than justice, but noo that we've identified justice wi' wisdom and virtue, it's easy tae see that justice is stronger than injustice, if injustice is jist ignorance. Nae yin can argue wi' that noo. But Thrasymachus, I want tae consider this fae a different angle: Ye widnae deny that a state can be unjust and try and enslave ither states unfairly, or maybe they've already enslaved them and are keepin a hauf dozen o' them under their thumb?"

"True enough," he says, "and I wid even add that the best and completely unjust state wid be maist likely tae dae that."

"I ken," I says, "that wis whit ye said afore. But whit I want tae consider further is whether this power that a stronger state has can even exist or be used without justice. If yer richt in yer view, and justice is wisdom, then it can only exist wi' justice. But if I'm richt, then it can exist without justice."

"I'm happy tae see ye naebody just noddin in agreement or disagreement noo, Thrasymachus, but actually makin some excellent answers."

"That's jist oot o' politeness tae ye," he says.

"Ye're very kind," I says, "and wid ye also be so kind as tae tell me, whether ye think a state, or an army, or a gang o' robbers and thieves, or ony ither group o' evildoers could act at all if they were hurtin each other?"

"Nae chance," he says, "they couldnae."

"But if they stopped hurtin each other, then they could act thegither better?"

"Aye."

"An that's because injustice creates divisions and hatred and fechtin, and justice brings harmony and friendship; is that no true, Thrasymachus?"

"I agree," he says, "because I dinnae want tae argue wi' ye."

"How good o' ye," I says, "but I wid also like tae ken whether injustice, since it tends tae cause hatred wherever it exists, whether amang slaves or freemen, will it no make them hate each other and cause arguments and make them incapable o' workin thegither?"

"Absolutely."

"An even if there's only twa o' them who are unjust, will they no argue and fecht, and become enemies tae each other and tae the just?"

"They will."

"An suppose injustice wis in just one person, wid yer wisdom say that they lose or keep their natural power?"

"Let's say they keep their power."

"But isnae the power that injustice uses o' a kind that wherever it goes, whether it's in a city, an army, a family, or ony ither group, that group is, first o' all, made incapable o' workin thegither because o' rebellion and distraction? An disnae it become its ain enemy and at odds wi' everyone who opposes it, and wi' the just? Is that no the case?"

"Aye, absolutely."

"An isnae injustice jist as bad when it's in just one person? First o' all, it makes them incapable o' takin action because they're no at peace wi' themsels, and secondly, it makes them an enemy tae themsels and the just? Is that no true?"

"Aye."

"An my friend," I says, "surely the gods are just?"

"Granted that they are."

"But if that's the case, the unjust will be the enemy o' the gods, and the just will be their friend?"

"Feast yersel on triumph, and get yer fill o' the argument. I winnae argue back, in case I upset the company."

"Weel then," I says, "carry on answerin me, and let me finish my meal. Because we've already shown that the just are clearly wiser, better and mair capable than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable o' workin thegither. In fact, even mair than that, it wisnae strictly true whit we said afore aboot evil men bein able tae act forcefully thegither. If they wis completely evil, they wid hae turned on each other. But it's clear that there must hae been some wee bit o' justice left in them, that allowed them tae work thegither. If there hadnae been, they wid hae hurt each other as well as their victims. They were only halfway villains in their schemes, because if they'd been completely villainous and utterly unjust, they widnae hae been able tae act at all. That, as I believe, is the truth o' the matter, and no what ye said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons I've already given, but I still want tae explore this further, because it's no wee thing that's at stake - it's nothin less than how humans should live their lives.

Carry on then."

"I'll start by askin a question: Wid ye no say that a horse has a purpose?"

"Aye, I wid."

"An the purpose or use o' a horse or onything else would be that which couldnae be accomplished, or no done as well, by any other thing?"

"I dinnae quite understand," he says.

"Let me explain it better: Can ye see anythin except with yer eyes?"

"Absolutely no."

"Or hear except with yer lugs?"

"No."

"Then these could be truly said tae be the purposes o' these organs?"

"They could be."

"But ye can cut aff a vine branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?"

"Of course."

"An yet no as well as with special wee shears made for the purpose?"

"True."

"So could we no say that that's the purpose of wee vine-cuttin shears?"

"We could."

"Then noo I think ye'll understand what I meant when I asked the question whether the purpose o' anythin would be that which couldnae be accomplished, or no done as well, by any other thing?"

"I understand what ye mean," he says, "and I agree."

"An something that has a purpose also has a special strength or ability. Dis there any need tae ask again whether the eye has a purpose?"

"It has."

"An disnae the eye also have a special strength?"

"Aye."

"An the lug has a purpose and a special strength an aw?"

"True."

"An the same is true o' aw the ither things; they each o' them hae a purpose and a special ability?"

"That's true."

"Weel then, can the eyes dae their job if they're lackin their ain special ability and instead hae a weakness?"

"How could they," he says, "if they're blind and cannae see?"

"Ye mean tae say, if they hae lost their ain special ability, which is sicht; but I havenae gotten tae that point yet. I'd rather ask the question in a mair general wey, and just enquire whether the things that dae their jobs dae them by their ain special abilities, and fail tae dae them because o' their ain weaknesses?"

"Absolutely," he replied.

"I could say the same thing aboot the lugs; when they lose their ain special ability they cannae dae their job?"

"True."

"An the same observation will apply to aw the ither things?"

"I agree."

"Weel then; disnae the soul hae a purpose that nothin else can fulfil? For example, tae oversee things, gie orders, think things through, and the like. Arenae these jobs specific tae the soul, and can they really be given tae onything else?"

"Tae naething else."

"An isnae life considered tae be yin o' the purposes o' the soul?"

"Absolutely," he says.

"An disnae the soul also hae a special strength?"

"Aye."

"An can she or can she no fulfil her ain purposes when lackin that special strength?"

"She cannae."

"Then a bad soul must necessarily be a bad leader and overseer, and the good soul a good leader?"

"Aye, necessarily."

"An we agreed that justice is the special strength o' the soul, and injustice the weakness o' the soul?"

"That has been agreed."

"Then the just soul and the just man will live a good life, and the unjust man will live a bad life?"

"That's what yer argument shows."

"An the one who lives a good life is blessed and happy, and the one who lives a bad life is the opposite o' happy?"

"Certainly."

"Then the just person is happy, and the unjust person is miserable?"

"So be it."

"But happiness and no misery is beneficial?"

"Of course."

"Then, my blessed Thrasymachus," (said in a sarcastic tone) "injustice can never be more beneficial than justice."

"Weel, Socrates," he says, "let this be yer wee treat for the Bendidea festival (festival of Artemis)."

"Weel, thanks tae ye for that," I says, "seein as ye've gotten a wee bit softer on me and stopped shoutin. However, it wisnae a particularly entertainin time for me, but that wis ma ain fault, no yours. It's like a fussy eater who just nabs a wee taste o' every dish that comes oot the kitchen, never giein themsels time tae properly enjoy the last yin. That's whit I've been like, jumpin fae yin subject tae the next withoot ever discoverin whit I wis lookin for at the start - the true nature o' justice. I left that question behind and went aff on a tangent considerin whether justice wis virtue and wisdom or wickedness and foolishness. An then when anither question popped up about the advantages o' justice compared tae injustice, I couldnae resist jumpin on tae that as well. An the end result o' this whole debate is that I ken absolutely nothin at all. Because I dinnae ken whit justice is, and so I cannae possibly ken whether it's a virtue or no, nor can I say whether the just person is happy or unhappy."

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