Beuk 2, Part 1

Socrates - Glauco

Efter sayin that, I thocht I had reached the end o' oor discussion, but the end, as it turned oot, wis juist the beginnin. Glaucon, who is aye the maist argumentative o' men, wisnae happy that Thrasymachus wisnae fechtin anymair. He widnae gie up the battle. Sae he says tae me: "Socrates, dae ye really want tae convince us, or are ye juist tryin tae seem like ye've convinced us, that bein just is aye better than bein unjust?"

"I wid really like tae convince ye," I answered, "if I could."

"Then ye definitely havenae succeeded. Let me ask ye noo: Hou wid ye sort guid things intae categories? Is there no some things we appreciate for their ain sake, separate fae whit happens efter, like for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments that gie us joy at the time, even though nothin comes o' them efter?"

"I agree that there is a group like that," I answered.

"Is there no also a second group o' guid things, like knowledge, sicht, health, that are desirable no juist for themsels, but an aw for whit they bring?"

"Absolutely," I said.

"An wid ye no recognise a third group, like gymnastics, takin care o' the sick, and the doctor's trade? An aw the different ways o' makin siller - these dae us guid but we see them as unpleasant; and nae yin wid choose them for their ain sake, but juist for the sake o' some reward or result that comes oot o' them?"

"There is," I said, "this third group an aw. But why are ye askin?"

"Because I want tae ken in which o' the three groups wid ye pit justice?"

"In the highest group," I answered, "amang those things that someone who wants tae be happy desires baith for their ain sake and for whit they bring."

"Then a lot o' fowk hae a different opinion; they think that justice should be thocht o' as somethin troublesome, amang things that are pursued for the sake o' rewards and a guid reputation, but are unpleasant in themsels and something tae be avoided."

"I ken," I said, "that that's hoo a lot o' fowk think, and that wis the idea that Thrasymachus wis puttin forward juist noo, when he criticised justice and praised injustice. But I'm ower stupid tae be convinced by him."

"I wid like it," he said, "that ye wid listen tae me as well as him, and then I'll see whether you and me agree. Because Thrasymachus seems tae me, like a snake, tae hae been calmed doon by yer voice sooner than he should hae been. But tae my mind the nature o' justice and injustice hasnae yet been made clear. Settin aside their rewards and results, I want tae ken whit they are in themsels, and hoo they wirk inside the soul. If ye wid like, then, I'll bring back Thrasymachus' argument. And first I will speak aboot the nature and origin o' justice accorddin tae the common view o' them. Secondly, I will show that aw men who practise justice dae so against their will, oot o' necessity, but no as somethin guid. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life o' the unjust man is efter aw far better than the life o' the just man - if whit they say is true, Socrates, since I masel am no o' their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am confused when I hear the voices o' Thrasymachus and thoosans o' ithers bummin in my lug; and, on the ither hand, I hae never yet heard the superiority o' justice tae injustice maintained by any yin in a satisfactory wey. I want tae hear justice praised for its ain sake; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am maist likely tae hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life tae the best o' my ability, and my wey o' speakin will indicate the wey in which I want tae hear you an aw praisin justice and criticisin injustice. Will ye say whether ye approve o' my proposal?"

Aye, that's exactly how I feel an aw! I cannae think o' any ither topic that a wise man wid want tae discuss mair often.

I'm delighted tae hear ye say that, Glaucon replied, and I'll start speakin, as I suggested, aboot the nature and origin o' justice.

Glaucon

They say that doin injustice is, by its very nature, a good thing; tae suffer injustice is evil. But the evil is greater than the good. An so when fowk hae baith done and suffered injustice and hae experience o' baith, no bein able tae avoid the yin and get the ither, they think it's better tae agree amang themsels tae hae neither; that's how laws and agreements came aboot atween fowk; and whit is ordered by law is cried legal and just by them. This, they say, is the origin and nature o' justice - it's a middle ground or compromise, atween the best thing o' aw, which is tae dae injustice and no be punished, and the worst thing o' aw, which is tae suffer injustice withoot bein able tae strike back. And justice, bein in the middle atween the twa, is tolerated no as somethin guid, but as the lesser evil, and is honoured because fowk cannae dae injustice. Because nae man who deserves tae be called a man wid ever agree tae sic an agreement if he wis able tae resist it; he wid be daft if he did. That's the common wey o' thinkin, Socrates, aboot the nature and origin o' justice.

Noo, that those who practise justice dae so against their will and because they dinnae hae the power tae be unjust will be best seen if we imagine somethin like this: lat's gie baith the just and the unjust man the power tae dae whit they want, and watch and see whaur desire leads them; then we'll discover straucht away that the just and unjust man are baith gaun alang the same road, efter their ain interests, which aw creatures see as bein their good thing, and are only turned ontae the path o' justice by the force o' law. The freedom we're pretendin they hae could be best gien tae them in the form o' a magic power like the yin they say Gyges, the forfaither o' Croesus the Lydian king, had. The story goes that Gyges wis a shepherd wairkin for the king o' Lydia. There wis a terrible storm, and an earthquake made a hole in the grund whaur he wis tendin his flock. Amazed at the sicht, he climbed doun intae the hole, whaur, amang ither weird things, he saw a hollow bronze horse wi doors. He stooped doun and peeked in, and saw a deid body that wis apparently bigger than a human, and wisnae wearin anythin except a gold ring. He tuk this ring aff the deid man's finger and climbed back oot. Noo the shepherds met thegither, as wis their custom, tae gie their monthly report aboot the flocks tae the king. He joined their gatherin wi the ring on his finger, and as he wis sittin amang them he happened tae turn the gem o' the ring intae his palm. Aw o' a sudden he became invisible tae the rest o' the fowk and they started speakin aboot him as if he wisnae there anymair. He wis astonished at this, and sae he touched the ring again and turned the gem outwards and reappeared. He tried this trick a few times, and it aye worked the same wey - whan he turned the gem inwards he became invisible, whan he turned it ootwards he reappeared. Sae he planned tae become yin o' the messengers that wis sent tae the court. Whan he got there, he seduced the queen, and wi her help owerthrew the king and killed him, and tuk the throne for himsel. Noo suppose there wis twa o' these magic rings, and the just man pit yin o' them on and the unjust man pit the ither yin on; ye cannae imagine ony man bein that strong-willed that he wid stick tae bein just. Nae man wid keep his hands aff things that didnae belong tae him if he could safely tak whatever he wanted fae the market, or brak intae houses and sleep wi onybody he fancied, or kill or set free ony prisoner he wanted, and basically be like a god amang men. Then the actions o' the just man wid be the same as the actions o' the unjust man; they wid baith end up in the same place. Aye, an that's a richt braw point tae consider - a true sign that a man is just isnae that he actively wants tae be or that he thinks justice is ony benefit tae him personally, but mair a case o' necessity. Because onybody who thinks they can safely be unjust, weel, they'll be unjust. Because deep doon a lot o' fowk believe that injustice brings a far greater benefit tae the individual than justice does, and whoever argues the wey I hae been arguin' wid say that they're richt. Imagine if somebody could get this power tae turn invisible, and yet they never did onything wrang or nickit anything that belonged tae somebody else - they wid be seen as a right daftie by everybody watchin, even though they wid praise him tae his face and pretend things wur awrite amang themsels, jist oot o' fear that they micht suffer injustice themsels. But enough o' that.

Noo, if we're truly gonnae mak a judgement aboot the life o' the just man and the unjust man, we need tae separate them completely; there's nae ither wey. But how are we gonnae dae this separation? Weel, here's what I propose: Let the unjust man be completely unjust, and the just man completely just. We cannae tak anything awa frae either o' them, and baith o' them need tae be perfectly equipped for whit they want tae dae in their lives. First o' aw, let the unjust man be like ither weel-kent maisters o' a craft; like a skilled pilot or doctor that kens innately whit they can dae and disnae try tae push their limits, and wha can fix any mistakes they mak. So the unjust man should dae his unjust schemes in the richt wey, and hide himsel if he wants tae be truly great at his injustice (because if somebody finds oot whit he's up tae, then he's nothin'): for the highest level o' injustice is tae be seen as bein just when ye actually arenae. That's why I say that in the perfectly unjust man, we need tae assume the maist perfect injustice; there cannae be any holdin back, we need tae alloo him, while he's bein as unjust as possible, tae get the best reputation for bein just. If he makes a mistake, he needs tae be able tae sort it oot; he needs tae be somebody who can speak persuasively if any o' his bad deeds come tae licht, and who can use force if that's whit it takes, wi his courage and strength, and connections and siller. And right next tae him, let's put the just man in aw his honesty and simplicity, wantin, as Aeschylus says, tae actually be good and no jist seem that wey. There cannae be ony pretence, because if he seems just he'll get honours and rewards, and then we winnae ken if he's bein just for the sake o' bein just or for the sake o' gettin praised and gettin rewards. So, let him jist be clothed in justice and that's aw he needs; and imagine him livin a life that's the complete opposite o' the other fella. Let him be the best o' men, but let everybody think he's the worst; then he'll truly hae been tested, and we'll see if he's bothered by the fear o' a bad reputation and whit that brings. And let him keep on livin this wey richt up until he dies; bein just but seemin unjust. When baith o' them hae reached the very extremes, yin o' justice and the ither o' injustice, then we can mak a judgement on which o' them is truly happier.

"Och, Glaucus, ma dear lad!" I says, "Ye put a braw polish on them, yin efter the ither, juist like ye wur giein a shine tae twa statues."

"I dae ma best," he says. "An noo that we ken whit they're like, there's nae bother describin the sort o' life that awaits each o' them. I'll get on wi that noo, but jist in case ye think it's a wee bit ower harsh, imagine, Socrates, that the words that come next arenae actually comin fae me. Let's gie them tae the fowk who praise injustice: They'll tell ye that the just man who is seen as unjust will get whipped, teetured, bund up - they'll burn his een oot; and finally, efter sufferin everythin bad ye can imagine, they'll stick him on a stake. Then he'll finally understand that he should jist seem just, and no actually be it; the words o' Aeschylus micht be truer for the unjust man than the just yin. Because the unjust man is efter something real; he disnae leeve his life carin aboot appearances - he wants tae be truly unjust and no jist seem that wey:

His mind has a soil deep and fertile,

Oot o' whilk spring his wise thochts.

First o' aw, folk think he's just, and so he becomes a leader in the city; he can marry wha he wants, and gie his dochter in marriage tae wha he wants; an aw he can trade and deal wherever he fancies, and aye tae his ain advantage, because he has nae qualms aboot bein unjust, and at every competition, public or private, he comes oot on top against his rivals, and gains at their expense, and gets rich, and oot o' his gains he can help his friends and harm his enemies. Mairover, he can mak offerings and gie gifts tae the gods in abundance and grandeur, and can honour the gods or any man he wants tae honour in a far better wey than the just man, and sae he's likely tae be mair weel-liked by them than they are. An that's how, Socrates, they say that the gods and fowk baith come thegither tae mak the life o' the unjust man better than the life o' the just man."

Adeimantus - Socrates

I wis juist gaun tae say something back tae Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his brither, cut me aff: "Socrates," he says, "ye disnae think there's nae mair tae be said on the matter?"

"Weel, whit else is there?" I answered.

"The strongest point o' aw hasnae even been mentioned yet," he replied.

"Weel then," I says, "gaun alang wi the proverb, 'Let brither help brither' - if he's missin somethin can ye help him oot? Although I huv tae confess that Glaucon has already said enough tae pit me in the dirt, and tak awa my ability tae defend justice."

"Dinnae be daft," he replied. "But let me add somethin mair: There's another side tae Glaucon's argument aboot the praise and criticism o' justice and injustice, which is equally important in order tae bring oot whit I believe tae be his meanin. Parents and teachers are aye tellin their sons and their students that they should be just; but why? No for the sake o' bein just, but for the sake o' reputation and character; in the hope o' gettin for the lad who is seen as just some o' those positions, marriages, and the like that Glaucon has listed amang the advantages that come tae the unjust man who has a reputation for bein just. Mair is made o' appearances by this group o' fowk than ony ithers; because they throw in the idea o' bein weel-thoughto'-o' by the gods, and will tell ye aboot a hail shower o' benefits that the heavens, as they say, rain doon on the pious; and this agrees wi whit the great Hesiod and Homer say, the first o' wha says that the gods mak the oaks o' the just..."

Tae hear acorns rattlin at the tap o' their trees, and bees bummin in the middle; an the sheep wi their heavy fleeces. An a wheen ither blessin's o' a similar kin are provided for them. An Homer sings a very similar sang; for he speaks o' a man whose fame is like that o' a blameless king wha, like a god, upholds justice, and the black earth brings forth wheat and barley for him, and his trees are laden wi fruit, and his sheep aye gie birth, and the sea provides him wi fish. Even grander are the gifts o' heaven that Musaeus and his son say are gien tae the just; they tak them doon intae the underworld, whaur they hae the saints lyin on couches at a feast, eternally drunk, wi garlands on their heids. It seems their idea is that gettin pished foriver is the best reward for bein a good person! Some fowk even tak it further; they say that the descendants o' the faithful and just will survive for three or fower generations. That's the kind o' stuff they sing aboot justice. But for the wicked there's a different story; they bury them in a bog in Hades and mak them carry watter in a sieve; an even while they're still livin, they gie them a bad name and inflict on them the punishments that Glaucon described as the fate o' the just man who is seen as unjust. They cannae come up wi onything else. That's hoo they praise the yin and criticise the ither.

Juist ance mair, Socrates, I'll ask ye tae consider anither wey o' speakin aboot justice and injustice, that ye disnae juist hear frae poets, but also frae writers that work in prose. Fowk are always sayin that justice and bein a good person are honourable, but sair and laborious; and that the pleasures o' vice and injustice are easy tae get, and are only condemned by the law and public opinion. They say an aw that honesty is, for the maist part, less profitable than dishonesty; and they're quite happy tae cry wicket fowk happy, and gie them honour in public and private whan they're rich or influential in ony wey, while they look doon on and ignore those who micht be puir and powerless, even if they admit that they're better fowk. But the maist extraordinary thing o' aw is whit they say aboot virtue and the gods: they say that the gods gie hardship and misery tae a lot o' good fowk, and gie prosperity and happiness tae the wicked. And wee scrounging prophets gang roon tae rich fowk's doors and convince them that they hae the power, gien by the gods, tae mak amends for a man's ain sins or his ancestors' sins bi sacrificin things or doin wee charms, alang wi parties and feasts; and they promise tae harm an enemy, whether they're just or unjust, for a wee fee; wi magic tricks and chants, they claim tae force heaven tae dae whit they want. And they point tae the poets as their authority, smoothin the path o' vice wi Hesiod's words:

"Vice can be had in abundance withoot any bother; the wey is smooth and her dwellin-place is near. But afore virtue the gods hae set toil, and a lang, uphill road."

Then they bring Homer in as a witness that the gods can be swayed by men; for he says an aw:

"The gods, too, can be turned from their purpose; and fowk pray tae them and turn aside their wrath wi sacrifices and soft pleas, and wi drinks and the smell o' fat, whan they hae sinned and done wrang."

An they produce a wheen buiks written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were apparently the sons o' the Moon and the Muses - at least that's whit they say - that describe rituals they dae, and convince no jist individuals, but hale cities, that they can mak it up tae the gods for their sins bi sacrificin things and haein fun shows that pass the time, and can be done for the livin and the dead; they call these last yins "mysteries," and they say they save us from the pains o' hell, but if we dinnae dae them, naebody kens whit's waitin for us.

He carries on: "An noo, whan the youngins hear aw this claptrap bein spouted aboot virtue and vice, and hoo the gods and fowk view them, whit wey are their minds likely tae be swayed, my dear Socrates? I mean the clever ones, the yins that flit aboot like bees on a flower, landin on everythin, and takin away conclusions fae aw they hear aboot whit wey they should live and act gin they want tae mak the maist o' their life? Maist likely, the young lad will say tae himsel, in the words o' Pindar:

"'Can I climb a higher tower, either by bein juist or by some sly, deceitful wey, that can be a fortress for me aw ma days? Because whit fowk say is that if I'm truly juist, but nae yin thinks I am, there's nae benefit, but clear as day is the pain and loss I'll suffer. But if I'm unjust, yet I get a reputation for bein juist, then a braw life in heaven is promised tae me. Since then, as thir philosophers say, appearances rule ower truth and are the lord o' happiness, then it's appearances I must focus on. I'll paint a picture and a shadow o' virtue roon aboot me, like a fancy entrance tae my hoose; but ahint it aw, I'll drag alang the cunning and crafty fox, juist like Archilochus, the greatest o' wise men, recommends. Yet, I hear some yin shoutin that it's often hard tae hide yer wickedness; tae that I answer, Nae great thing is easy. Nevertheless, this argument suggests this is the path we should tak if we want tae be happy. Tae hide it aw, we'll set up secret gangs and political clubs. An there's professors o' rhetoric that teach ye hoo tae persuade coorts and assemblies; sae, partly wi persuasion and partly wi force, I'll mak ill-gotten gains and no be punished. Still, I hear a voice sayin that the gods cannae be fooled, neither can they be forced. But whit if there are nae gods? Or, lat's say they dinnae care aboot human things - why in either case should we fash ower hidin it? An even if there are gods, and they dae care aboot us, yet we only ken o' them frae stories and the sangs o' the poets; and thir are juist the very fowk that say they can be swayed and turned by 'sacrifices and soft pleas, and by offerings.' Sae let's be consistent then, and believe baith o' them or neither. If the poets speak true, then we micht as weel be unjust, and offer some o' the fruits o' oor injustice; because if we're juist, even though we escape the revenge o' heaven, we'll lose oot on the gains o' injustice; but, if we're unjust, we'll keep the gains, and bi our sinnin and prayin, and prayin and sinnin, the gods will be appeased, and we winnae be punished. 'But there's a world below whaur either us or oor descendants will suffer for oor unjust deeds.' Aye, my friend, will be the thocht, but there's mysteries and deities that can mak amends, and they hae a lot o' power. That's whit mighty cities declare; and the sons o' the gods, wha were their poets and prophets, gie the same testimony.

So on what grounds then, should we ever choose justice over pure and utter wickedness? Because if we just combine wickedness with a phony show of bein a good person, things will go well for us apparently, both with the gods and with other folk, in life and after death, accordin' tae maist fowk and the most important authorities. Knowin all this, Socrates, hoo can any man who is a wee bit brighter, or better lookin, or richer, or comes fae a brawer faimly, be willin' tae gie respect to justice? Or even stop himsel laughin when he hears it gettin praised? An even if there wis some yin wha could prove me wrang, and wha wis convinced that justice is best, they still wouldnae be angry wi the unjust, but wad be richt happy tae forgive them. Because they ken an aw that fowk arenae juist o' their ain free will; unless maybe there's some yin wha the gods themselves hae put a hatred o' injustice inside, or wha has gotten hold o' the truth - but nae ither body. The only folk wha blame injustice are those that, because o' cowardice or age or some sic weakness, disnae hae the power tae be unjust themselves. And this is proven by the fact that as soon as they get the chance, they become as unjust as they possibly can be.

The reason for aw this, Socrates, wis hinted at by us right at the beginning o' oor chat, when my brither and I told ye hoo astonished we were tae discover that oot o' aw the fowk that sing the praises o' justice - startin wi the auld heroes that ony stories have survived aboot, richt up tae the folk o' oor ain time - nae yin has ever properly slated injustice or gien justice its due credit, except for the glory, honours, and benefits that come alang wi it. Nae yin has ever properly explained, either in verse or prose, the true inner essence o' either o' them that sits within the soul, unseen by ony human or divine eye; or shown that oot o' aw the things a man has inside his soul, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. If that had been the normal wey o' talkin aboot it, if ye had tried tae convince us o' this fae bein young weans, then we widnae hae been spyin on each ither tae try and stop us doin wrang. Instead, every yin would hae been their own watchdog, because they wid be feart that if they did somethin bad, they wid be harbourin the greatest evil inside themsel. I wid imagine that Thrasymachus and ithers wid seriously say the same things I huv just been blawin on aboot, and even stronger stuff about justice and injustice, completely twistin their true nature, as far as I can see. But I speak in this passionate wey, as I must freely confess tae ye, because I want tae hear the opposite side fae you. And I wid ask ye tae no only show the superiority that justice has over injustice, but what effect they each hae on the person who possesses them, that maks the yin a good thing and the other an evil thing, whether it's seen or unseen by gods and men.

Now, as Glaucon requested o' ye, please leave oot reputations; because unless ye tak away fae each o' them their true reputation and stick on a fake yin, we'll just say that ye arenae praisin justice, but the way it looks on the surface. We'll think that ye're just tellin us tae keep oor injustice hidden, and that ye really agree wi Thrasymachus that justice is somethin that benefits other folk and is in the stronger person's interests, and that injustice is a man's ain personal profit and benefit, even though it harms the weaker folk. Noo, since ye have agreed that justice is one o' the top kind o' goods that are desired for the results they bring, but far more for their ain sake - like sicht or hearin or knowledge or health, or ony ither real and natural good and no just a made-up yin - then in yer praise o' justice, I wid ask ye tae focus on just this yin point: I mean the essential good and evil that justice and injustice cause in the fowk that possess them. Let other folk praise justice and criticise injustice, blawin up the rewards and honours o' the yin and slagging off the other; that's a way o' arguin that I'm willin' tae put up wi if it comes fae them. But fae you, wha has spent his whole life thinkin aboot this question, unless I hear somethin different comin oot yer ain mouth, I expect somethin better. An awricht then, I say it again, no only prove tae us that justice is better than injustice, but show us what effect they each hae on the person who possesses them, that maks the yin a guid thing and the ither an evil thing, whether it's seen or unseen by gods and men.

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