Book 4, Part 4

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Socrates - Glaucon

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"For example," says I, "can the same thing be at rest an' in motion at the same time in the same pairt?"

"Impossible."

"Still," says I, "let's hae a mair precise statement o' terms, lest we should fa' oot bi the wey. Imagine the case o' a fella wha's stanning an' an aa movin' his haunds an' his heid, an' suppose a person tae say that yin an' the same fella is in motion an' at rest at the same moment - tae sic a wey o' speakin' we should object, an' should rather say that yin pairt o' him is in motion while anither is at rest."

"Very true."

"An' suppose the objecter tae refine still further, an' tae draw the nifty distinction that no juist wee bits o' spinnin' tops, but hail tops, whan they spin roon wi' their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest an' in motion at the same time (an' he may say the same o' onything that turns roon in the same spot), his objection widnae be admitted bi us, because in sic cases things arenae at rest an' in motion in the same pairts o' themsels; we should rather say that they hae baith an axle an' a rim, an' that the axle stands still, for there's nae gaun awa' frae bein' straucht up an' doon; an' that the rim goes roon. But if, whan spinnin' roon, the axle leans a wee bit tae the richt or left, forwards or backwards, then in nae wey can they be at rest."

"That's the richt wey tae describe them," he answered.

"Then nane o' thir objections will confuse us, or mak us believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same pairt or in relation tae the same thing, can act or be acted upon in opposite wey."

"Certainly no, no gaun by the wey I see things.

Yet," says I, "that we dinnae need tae be forced tae look at aa sic objections, an' prove at lenth that they're wrang, let's juist assume they widnae mak sense, an' keep gaun on the basis that if, later on, this assumption turns oot tae be wrang, then aw the consequences that follae it will hae tae be withdrawn."

"Aye," says he, "that'll be the best wey."

"Weel," says I, "wid ye no allou that agreein' an' disagreein', wantin' an' no wantin', bein' drawn in an' pushed awa', are aa opposites, whether they're seen as bein' active or passive (cause that disnae mak a difference tae the fact that they're opposite)?

"Aye," says he, "they are opposites."

"Weel," says I, "an' hunger an' thirst, an' desires in general, an' again wantin' an' wushin' - aa thae things ye wid pit intae the classes we've already mentioned. Ye wid say - wid ye no? - that the soul o' somebody wha desires something is lookin' for the thing they want; or that they're puin' the thing they want tae hae close tae themsels: or again, whan a fella wants somethin' tae be gien tae him, his mind, wantin' his desires tae come true, lets somebody ken he wants it by noddin' his heid in agreement, as if he'd been spiered a question?"

"Very true."

"An' what wid ye say aboot no wantin' something an' no likin' somethin' an' no haein' a desire; shouldnae thir no be pit intae the opposite class o' pushin' awa' an' rejectin'?"

"Certainly."

"Admittin' this is true o' desires generally, let's assume a special group o' desires, an' oot o' these we'll pick hunger an' thirst, as they're cried, which are the maist obvious yin?"

"Let's tak that group," says he.

"The thing that yin wants is food, an' the ither wants drink?"

"Aye."

"An' here comes the important bit: isnae thirst the desire that the soul has for drink, an' juist drink; no for drink wi' onything else added on; for example, warm or cauld, or a lot or a wee bit, or, in a word, drink o' ony specific kind: but if the thirst is alang wi' heat, then the desire is for cauld drink; or, if alang wi' cauld, then for warm drink; or, if the thirst is ower strong, then the drink that's desired will be a lot; or, if no that strong, the amount o' drink will an aa be wee: but thirst pure an' simple will want drink pure an' simple, that's the natural satisfaction o' thirst, as food is o' hunger?"

"Aye," says he; "the simple desire is, as ye say, in every case for the simple object, an' the complex desire for the complex object."

"But here a confusion micht arise; an' I wid like tae be careful that an opponent disnae jump up an' say that nae man wants juist drink, but guid drink, or juist food, but guid food; for 'guid' is the main thing everybody wants, an' thirst bein' a desire, will need tae be a thirst for guid drink; an' the same is true o' every ither desire."

"Aye," he replied, "the opponent micht hae something tae say."

Alis weel.

An disnae the same notion haud true for the sciences? The aim o science is knowledge (lettin that be the richt definition), but the main focus o a specific science is a special kind o knowledge. I mean, for ensaumple, the science o biggin hooses is a kynd o knowledge that's set apart an different frae ithers an is for that grund cried airchitectur.

Aye, juist sae.

Is it acause it haes a special quality nae ither science possesses?

Aye.

An it haes this special quality acause it studies a specific kind o thing; an this is true o aw the ither airts an sciences?

Aye.

Richt sae, then, gin I've made mysel clear, ye'll ken whit I wis oreeginally on aboot whan I spak o relatives. My meanin wis, that gin yin term o a relation is taen its lane, the ither is taen its lane; gin yin term is qualified, the ither is qualified an aw. I dinna mean tae say that relatives canna be unalike, or that the science o health is hale an fersh, or o sickness necessarily seek, or that the sciences o guid an evil are tharefor guid an evil; but juist that, whan the term science is nae langer uised absolutely, but haes a qualified object that in this case is the naitur o health an sickness, it becomes defined, an is hence cried no juist science, but the science o medicine.

I unnerstaun that aa richt, an I think the same wey as ye dae.

Wad ye no say that drouth is yin o these terms that are essentially relative, clearly haein a relation tae somethin--

Aye, drouth is relative tae drink.

An a certain kind o drouth is relative tae a certain kind o drink; but drouth taen its lane is neither muckle nor wee, nor guid nor ill, nor o ony specific kind o drink, but o drink anerly?

Certainly.

Then the saul o the drouthy yin, insaefa as he is drouthy, desires juist drink; for this he yearns an tries tae obtain it?

That's clear.

An if ye suppose somethin that pulls a drouthy saul awa frae drink, that maun be different frae the drouthy principle that draws him like a beast tae drink; for, as we wis sayin, the same thing canna act in contrair weyis aboot the same thing at the same time wi the same pairt o itsel.

Impossible.

Nae mair nor ye can say that the haunds o the archer push an pyke the bow at the same time, but whit ye say is that yin haund pushes an the ither pykes.

Juist sae, he replied.

An micht a man be drouthy, an yet unwilling tae drink?

Aye, he said, it happeus aw the time.

An in sic a case whit is yin tae say? Wad ye no say that thare wis somethin in the saul biddin a man tae drink, an somethin else forbydin him, that is ither an sterker nor the principle that bids him?

I sud say sae.

An the forbyddin principle is derived frae reason, an that which bids an attracts proceeds frae passion an sickness?

Clearly.

Then we may fairly assume that they are twa, an that they differ frae ane anither; the yin wi which man reasons, we may ca the rational principle o the saul, the ither, wi which he loes an hungers an thirsts an feels the flutterings o ony ither desire, may be termed the irrational or appetative, the ally o sundry pleasures an satisfactions?

Aye, he said, we may fairly assume them tae be different.

Then lat us finally determine that thare are twa principles existin in the saul. An whit o passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin tae yin o the precedin?

I sud be inclined tae say --akin tae desire.

Weel, I said, thare is a tale that I mind tae hae heard, an in whilk I pit faith. The tale is, that Leontius, the son o Aglaion, comin up yin day frae the Piraeus, unner the north waw on the ootside, obseryed some deid bodies lyin on the grund at the place o execution. He felt a keenness tae see them, but an aa a dread an disgust o them; for a wee while he wrassled an hid his een, but at last the desire wan the upper haund; an forcin them open, he ran up tae the deid bodies, sayin, Luik ye scunnerin things, get yer fill o this braw sicht!

"I've heard that yin masel," he said.

"The moral o the tale is that anger can whiles gang tae war wi desire, as if they wur twa separate things."

"Aye, that's the meanin," he said.

"An is there no a wheen o ither cases whaur we see that whan a man's desires win oot ower his reason, he'll cry shame on himsel, an be angry at the violence within him, an that in this fecht, that's like the fechtin o factions in a state, his spirit is on the side o his reason? But for the passionate or feisty part tae tak pairt wi the desires whan reason says it shouldnae be opposed, is a kind o thing that I dinna believe ye've ever seen happenin in yersel, nor, as I wid imagine, in onybody else?"

"Certainly no."

"Suppose a man thinks he's done a wrang tae anither, the mair noble he is the less able is he tae feel indignant at ony sufferin, sic as hunger, or cauld, or ony ither pain that the yin he's wranged micht inflict upon him – these he considers juist, an, as I say, his anger refuses tae be riled by them."

"True," he said.

"But whan he thinks that he's the yin sufferin the wrang, then he blaws his tap an rages, an is on the side o whit he believes is juistice; an acause he suffers hunger or cauld or ither pain he's juist the mair determined tae perssevere an conquer. His noble spirit winna be cowed until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice o the shepherd, that is, reason, tellin his dug tae bark nae mair."

"The illustration is perfect," he replied; "an in oor state, as we were sayin, the auxiliaries wur tae be dugs, an tae heed the voice o the rulers, wha are their shepherds."

"I see," I said, "that ye understand me fine; there is, however, a further point that I wush ye tae consider."

"Whit point?"

"Ye mind that passion or spirit seemed at first glance tae be a kind o desire, but noo we sud say quite the contrar; for in the fecht o the saul spirit is arrayed on the side o the rational principle."

"Absolutely."

"But a further question arises: Is passion different frae reason an aw, or juist a kind o reason; in whilk latter case, instead o three principles in the saul, there wid only be twa, the rational an the concupiscent; or rather, as the state wis composed o three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, sae micht there no be in the individual saul a third element that is passion or spirit, and whan no corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary o reason?"

"Aye," he said, "there maun be a third."

"Aye," I replied, "if passion, that has already been shown tae be different frae desire, turns oot an aa tae be different frae reason."

"But that's easy pitten tae the test: – We micht observe even in wee bairns that they are fu o spirit juist as soon as they are born, whereas some o them nivver seem tae attain tae the uiss o reason, an maist o them late enough."

"Excellent," I said, "an ye can see passion equally in brute beasts, whilk is a further pruif o the truth o whit ye are sayin. An we may ance mair appeal tae the words o Homer, that hae been already quoted by us,

He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul, for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons aboot the better an worse to be different frae the unreasonin anger which is rebuked by it."

Aye, that's richt true, he said.

An sae, efter a wheen gyrations, we've reached land an are fair agreed that the same principles that exist in the state exist an aa in the individual, an that they are three in nummer.

Juist sae.

Maun we no then infer that the individual is wise in the same wey, an bi the same quality that maks the State wise?

Certainly.

An aa that the same quality whilk constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, an that baith the State an the individual bear the same relation tae aw the ither virtues?

Absolutely.

An the individual will be acknowledged by us tae be just in the same wey in whilk the State is just?

That follows, o course.

We cannae but mind that the juistice o the State consisted in each o the three classes doin the wark o its ain class?

We're no very likely tae hae forgotten, he said.

We maun mind that the individual in whom the several qualities o his nature dae their ain wark will be just, an will dae his ain wark?

Aye, he said, we maun mind that an aa.

An sudnae the rational principle, whilk is wise, an haes the care o the hale saul, tae rule, an the passionate or feisty principle tae be the subject an ally?

Certainly.

An, as we were sayin, the combined influence o muisic an gymnastics will bring them intae accord, giein nerve an backin tae the reason wi noble words an lessons, an moderatin an soothin an civilizin the wildness o passion bi harmony an rhythm?

Quite true, he said.

An thir twa, thus raised an eddicated, an havin learned truly tae ken their ain functions, will rule ower the greedy or cravin pairt, whilk in each o us is the mucklemaist pairt o the saul an bi nature maist insatiable o gain; ower this they will keep guard, lest, waxin great an strang wi the fulness o bodily pleasures, as they are cried, the greedy saul, nae langer confined tae her ain sphere, sud try tae enslave an rule those wha arenae her natural-born subjects, an owerturn the hale life o man?

Very true, he said.

Baith thegither will thay no be the best defenders o the hale saul an the hale body against attacks frae withoot; the yin advisin, an the ither fechtin unner his leader, an bravely executin his commands an counsels?

True.

An him is tae be deemed courageous whas spirit retains in pleasure an in pain the commands o reason aboot whit he sud or sudnae fear?

Richt, he replied.

An him we call wise wha haes in him that wee bit pairt that rules, an whilk proclaims thir commands; that pairt an aa bein supposed tae hae a knowledge o whit is for the benefit o each o the three pairts an o the hale?

Absolutely.

An wad ye no say that he's temperate wha haes thir same elements in freendly harmony, whaur the yin rulin principle o reason, an the twa subservient anes o spirit an desire are aw agreed that reason sud rule, an dinna rebel?

Certainly, he said, that's the richt wey tae see temperance, whether in the state or the individual.

An surely, I said, we've explained again an again hoo an bi whit quality a man will be just.

That's clear as day.

An is juistice dimmer in the individual, an is her shape different, or is she the same as we fand her tae be in the state?

There's nae distinction in my opinion, he said.

Because, if ony dout is still lingerin in oor minds, a wheen ordinary examples will satisfy us o the truth o whit I am sayin'.

Whit kind o instances dae ye mean?

If the case is pitten tae us, maun we no admit that the just state, or the man wha's trained in the principles o sic a state, will be less likely nor the unjust tae mak awa wi a deposit o gowd or siller? Wid onybody deny this?

Nae yin, he replied.

Will the just man or citizan ever be guilty o sacrilege or thievery, or treachery either tae his freinds or tae his kintra?

Never.

Nae mair will he ever break a promise whaur thare hae been aiths or agreements?

Impossible.

Nae yin will be less likely tae commit adultery, or tae dishonour his faither an mither, or tae fail in his religious duties?

Nae yin.

An the reason is that ilk pairt o him is daein its ain wark, whether in rulin or bein ruled?

Juist sae.

Are ye satisfied then that the quality that maks sic men an sic states is juistice, or dae ye hope tae discover some ither?

Not me, indeed.

Then oor dream has been realised; an the suspicion that we entertained at the beginnin o oor wark o biggin, that some godly power maun hae led us tae a primary form o juistice, has noo been verified?

Aye, certainly.

An the division o labour that necessitatit the carpenter an the shoemaker an the rest o the citizenery tae be daein each his ain wark, an no anither's, wis a shadda o juistice, an for that raison it wis o uise?

Clearly.

But in reality juistice wis as we were describin, bein concerned tho, no wi the ooter man, but wi the inner man, whilk is the true sel an concern o man: for the just man disnae allou the several elements within him tae interfere wi yin anither, or ony o them tae dae the wark o ithers, --he sets in order his ain inner life, an is his ain maister an his ain law, an at peace wi himsel; an whan he has bunden thegither the three principles within him, whilk can be compared tae the heicher, laicher, an middle notes o the scale, an the intervals atween – whan he has bunden aw thir thegither, an is nae langer mony, but has become yin entirety temperate an perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds tae act, if he haes tae act, whether in a maitter o property, or in the treatment o the body, or in some affair o politics or private business; aye thinkin an callin that whilk preserves an cooperates wi this harmonious condition, juist an guid action, an the knowledge that presides ower it, wisdom, an that whilk at ony time skaddles this condition, he will ca unjust action, an the opinion that presides ower it ignorance.

Ye've said the vera truth, Socrates.

Very guid; an if we were tae say that we had discovered the just man an the just state, an the nature o juistice in ilk o them, we widnae be tellin a falsehood?

Maist certainly no.

May we say sae, then?

Lat us say sae.

An noo, I said, injustice needs tae be considered.

Clearly.

Maun injustice no be a stoushie that arises amang the three principles – a meddlin, an interference, an risin up o a pairt o the saul against the hale, an assertion o unlawful authority, whilk is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, o wha he is the natural vassal, – whit is aw this confusion an delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, an every form o vice?

Exactly so.

An if the nature o juistice an injustice be kent, then the meanin o actin unjustly an bein unjust, or, again, o actin juistly, will an aa be perfectly clear?

Whit dae ye mean? he said.

Weel, I said, they are like sickness an health; bein in the saul juist whit sickness an health are in the body.

Hoo sae? he said.

Weel, I said, that whilk is hale causes health, an that whilk is unhale causes sickness.

Aye.

An juist actions cause juistice, an unjust actions cause injustice?

That's certain.

An the creation o health is the institution o a natural order an government o yin by anither in the pairts o the body; an the creation o sickness is the production o a state o things at variance wi this natural order?

True.

An isnae the creation o juistice the institution o a natural order an government o yin by anither in the pairts o the saul, an the creation o injustice the production o a state o things oot o whack wi the natural order?

Exactly sae, he said.

Then virtue is the health an beauty an well-bein o the saul, an vice the sickness an weakness an deformity o the same?

True.

An disnae guid practices lead tae virtue, an ill practices tae vice?

Absolutely.

Still oor auld question o the comparative advantage o juistice an injustice hasnae been answered: Whilk is the mair profitable, tae be just an act justly an practise virtue, whether seen or unseen by gods an men, or tae be unjust an act unjustly, if only unpunished an unreformed?

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has noo become ridiculous (haud nae wey o sense). We ken that, whan the bodily constitution is awa, life is nae langer tholeable, though pampered wi aw kynds o meats an drinks, an haein aw wealth an aw pouer; an sal we be telt that whan the very essence o the vital principle is undermined an corrupted, life is still worth havin tae a man, if only he be alloued tae dae whit ever he likes wi the single exception that he isnae tae acquire juistice an virtue, or tae escape frae injustice an vice; assumin them baith tae be sic as we hae described?

Aye, I said, the question is, as ye say, ridiculous (haud nae wey o sense). Still, as we are near the steid whaur we micht see the truth in the clearest manner wi oor ain een, lat us no gie up alang the wey.

Certainly not, he replied.

Come up hither, I said, an behold the various forms o vice, thae o them, I mean, that are worth lookin at.

I am following you, he replied: proceed.

I said, The argument seems tae hae reached a heicht frae whilk, as frae some tower o speculation, a man micht look doon an see that virtue is yin, but that the forms o vice are unco numerous; thare bein fower special anes whilk are deservin o notice.

What dae ye mean? he said.

I mean, I replied, that thare appear tae be as mony forms o the saul as thare are distinct forms o the State.

Hoo mony?

There are five o the State, an five o the soul, I said.

What are they?

The first, I said, is that which we hae been describin, an whilk micht be said tae hae twa names, monarchy an aristocracy, accordin as rule is exercised by yin distinguished man or by mony.

True, he replied.

But I regard the twa names as describin yin form only; for whether the government is in the haunds o yin or mony, if the governors hae been trained in the manner whilk we hae supposed, the fundamental laws o the State will be maintained.

That is true, he replied.

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