Book 5 Part 3

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Socrates - ADEIMANTUS - GLAUCON - THRASYMACHUS (cont)

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Niest, hoo shall oor sodgers treat their enemies? Whit aboot this?

In whit wey dae ye mean?

First o aw, in regaird tae slavery? Dae ye think it richt that Hellenes sould enslave Hellenic States, or alloo ithers tae enslave them, if they can help it? Shoodnae their custom be tae spare them, considerin the danger whilk there is that the hale Hellenic race micht ae day fa under the yoke o the barbarians?

Tae spare them is infinitely better.

Then nae Hellene sud be owned bi them as a slave; that's a rule whilk they will observe an advise the ither Hellenes tae observe.

Certainly, he said; they will in this wey be unitet against the barbarians an will keep their haunds aff yin anither.

Niest as tae the slain; ocht the victors, I said, tae tak onything but their armour? Disnae the practice o plunderin an enemy gie an excuse for no facin the battle? Cowards skulk aboot the deid, pretendin that they are fulfillin a duty, an mony an airmy afore noo has been lost frae this luve o plunder.

Very true.

An is there noa lack o generosity an greed in robbin a corpse, an aa a degree o meanness an wummanishness in makin an enemy o the deid body whan the real enemy has flown awa an left only his fechtin gear behind him, --isnae this raither like a dug wha cannae get at his assailant, arguin wi the stanes whilk strike him instead?

Very like a dug, he said.

Then we maun haud back frae spoilin the deid or hinderin their buryin?

Aye, he replied, we maun maist certainly.

Naither shall we offer up airms at the temples o the gods, least o aw the airms o Hellenes, if we care tae maintain guid feelin wi ither Hellenes; an, indeed, we hae reason tae fear that the offerin o spoils taen frae kinsmen micht be a pollution unless commanded bi the god himsel?

Very true.

An again, as tae the devastation o Hellenic territory or the burnin o hooses, whit is tae be the practice?

May I hae the pleasure, he said, o hearin yer opinion?

Baith should be forbidden, in my judgement; I wid tak the annual produce an nae mair. Shall I tell ye why?

Aye, dae say wey.

Why, ye see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' an 'war,' an I imagine that there is aa a difference in their natures; the yin is expressive o whit is internal an inside the hame, the ither o whit is external an frae furrin lands; an the first o the twa is cried discord, an only the second, war.

That's a very proper distinction, he replied.

An micht I no observe wi equal propriety that the Hellenic race is aw unitit thegither bi ties o bluid an friendship, an alien an strange tae the barbarians?

Very guid, he said.

An therefore whan Hellenes fecht wi barbarians an barbarians wi Hellenes, they will be described bi us as bein at war whan they fecht, an bi nature enemies, an this kind o antagonism sud be cried war; but whan Hellenes fecht wi yin anither we shall say that Hellas is then in a state o disorder an discord, they bein bi nature friends an sic enmity is tae be cried discord.

I agree.

Consider then, I said, whan that whilk we hae acknowledged tae be discord occurs, an a ceety is dividit, if baith parties destroy the lands an burn the hooses o yin anither, hoo wicked dis the strife appear! Nae true lover o his kintra wid bring himsel tae tear in pieces his ain nurse an mither: There micht be reason in the victor deprivin the conquered o their hairst, but still they wid hae the idea o peace in their hairts an widnae mean tae go on fechtin for ever.

Aye, he said, that is a better temper than the ither.

An will no the ceety, whilk ye are foondin, be an Hellenic ceety?

It ocht tae be, he replied.

Then will no the ceetizens be guid an civilised?

Aye, very civilised.

An will they no be lovers o Hellas, an think o Hellas as their ain land, an share in the common temples?

Maist certainly.

An ony difference whilk arises amang them will be regarded bi them as discord only --a quarrel amang friends, whilk is no tae be cried a war?

Certainly not.

Then they will quarrel as those wha intend some day tae be reconciled?  Certainly.

They will use friendly correction, but will no enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?

Jist sae.

An as they are Hellenes themsels they will no devastate Hellas, nor will they burn hooses, no even suppose that the hale population o a ceety -- men, weemen, an weans -- are equally their enemies, for they ken that the guilt o war is aye confined tae a fiew fowk an that the mony are their friends. An for aw these reasons they will be unwilling tae waste their lands an raze their hooses; their enmity tae them will only last until the mony innocent sufferers hae compelled the guilty fiew tae gie satisfaction?

I agree, he said, that oor ceetizens sud thus deal wi their Hellenic enemies; an wi barbarians as the Hellenes noo deal wi yin anither.

Then lat us enact this law aa for oor guardians:-that they are neither tae devastate the lands o Hellenes nor tae burn their hooses.

Agreed; an we may agree aa in thinkin that these, aw oor previous enactments, are very guid.

But still I maun say, Socrates, that if ye are allooed tae go on in this wey ye will entirely forget the ither question whilk at the commencement o this discussion ye thrust aside: --Is sic an order o things possible, an hoo, if at aw? For I am quite ready tae acknowledge that the plan whilk ye propose, if only feasible, wid dae aw sorts o guid tae the State. I will add, whit ye hae omitted, that your ceetizens will be the bravest o warriors, an will niver leave their ranks, for they will aw ken yin anither, an ilk yin will call the ither faither, brither, son; an if ye suppose the weemen tae jine their airmies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror tae the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case o need, I ken that they will then be absolutely invincible; an there are mony domestic tic advantages whilk micht aa be mentioned an whilk I aa fully acknowledge: but, as I admit aw these advantages an as mony mair as ye please, if only this State o yours were tae come intae existence, we need say nae mair aboot them; assumin then the existence o the State, lat us noo turn tae the question o possibility an ways an means --the rest may be left.

If I loiter for a moment, ye instantly mak a raid upon me, I said, an hae nae mercy; I hae hardly escaped the first an second waves, an ye seem no tae be aware that ye are noo bringin upon me the third, whilk is the greatest an heaviest. When ye hae seen an heard the third wave, I think ye will be mair considerate an will acknowledge that some fear an hesitation wis natural respectin a proposal so extraordinary as that whilk I hae noo tae state an investigate.

The mair appeals o this sort whilk ye mak, he said, the mair determined are we that ye shall tell us hoo sic a State is possible: speak oot an at ance.

Lat me begin by remindin ye that we foond oor wey hither in the search efter jestice an injustice.

True, he replied; but whit o that?

I wis only gaun tae ask whether, if we hae discovered them, we are tae require that the just man sud in nothin fail o absolute jestice; or may we be satisfied wi an approximation, an the attainment in him o a higher degree o jestice than is tae be foond in ither men?

The approximation will be enough.

We are arstellin at the nature o absolute jestice an intae the character o the perfectly just man, an intae injustice an the perfectly unjust, that we micht hae an ideal. We were tae leuk at thir in order that we micht jalouse o oor ain happiness an unhappiness accordin tae the standard whilk they exhibitit an the degree in whilk we resembled them, but no wi ony view o showin that they could exist in fact.

True, he said.

Wid a peenter be any the warse because, efter havin drawn oot wi consummate airt an ideal o a perfectly bonnie man, he wis unable tae shaw that ony sic man could ever hae existed?

He wid be nane the warse.

Weel, an were we no creatin an ideal o a perfect State?

Tae be sure.

An is oor theory a warse theory because we are unable tae pruive the possibility o a city bein ordered in the gait describit?

Surely no, he replied.

That's the truth, I said. But if, at yer request, I am tae try an shaw hoo an unner whit conditions the possibility is heichest, I maun ask ye, havin this in view, tae repeat yer former admissions.

Whit admissions?

I want tae ken whether ideals are ever fully realised in language? Disnae the word express mair nor the fact, an maunnae the actual, whitsoever a man may think, aye, in the nature o things, faur short o the truth? Whit dae ye say?

I agree.

Then ye maunna insist on my provin that the actual State will in every respect coincide wi the ideal: if we are only able tae discover hoo a city may be governed nearly as we proponed, ye will admit that we hae discovered the possibility whilk ye demand; an will be contentit. I am sure that I should be contentit --will no you?

Aye, I will.

Lat me niest endeavour tae shaw whit is that fault in States whilk is the cause o their present misgovernment, an whit is the least change whilk will enable a State tae pass intae the truer form; an lat the change, if possible, be o yin thing only, or if no, o twa; at any rate, lat the changes be as few an slight as possible.

Certainly, he replied.

I think, I said, that there micht be a reform o the State if only yin change were made, whilk is no a slight or easy though still a possible ane.

Whit is it? he said.

Now then, I said, I go tae meet that whilk I liken tae the greatest o the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break an droon me in laughter an dishonour; an dae ye mark my words.

Proceed.

I said: Until philosophers are kings, or the kings an princes o this world hae the sprit an pouer o philosophy, an poleetical greatness an wisdom meet in yin, an those commoner natures wha pursue either tae the exclusion o the ither are compelled tae staund aside, cities will never hae rest frae their evils, --nor the human race, as I believe, --an then only will this oor State hae a possibility o life an behold the licht o day. Sic wis the thocht, my dear Glaucon, whilk I wid fain hae uttered if it hadnae seemed ower extravagant; for tae be convinced that in nae ither State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.

Socrates, whit dae ye mean? I wid hae ye consider that the word whilk ye hae lichtit oot is yin at which numerous fowk, an aw verra respectable fowk ower, like in a ploy raisin aff their claes aw in a blink o the ee, an seizin ony wappin that comes tae haund, will rin at ye wi aw their micht, afore ye ken whaur ye are, intendin tae dae whit wid ken whit; an if ye dinnae prepare an answer, an pit yersel in motion, ye will be richtly skelp’t bi their braw wits, an nae mistake.

Ye got me intae the pickle, I said.

An I wis juist richt; houiver, I will dae aw I can tae get ye oot o it; but I can only gie ye guid-will an guid advice, an, perhaps, I micht be able tae fit answers tae yer questions better nor anither -- that's aw. An noo, havin sic a helper, ye maun dae yer best tae shaw the fowk wha dinnae believe ye that ye are richt.

I sud gie it a try, I said, since ye offer me sic invaluable assistance. An I think that, if there is tae be a chance o oor escapin, we maun explain tae them wha we mean whan we say that philosophers are tae rule in the State; then we shall be able tae defend oorsels: There will be discovered tae be some fowk wha ocht tae study philosophy an tae be leaders in the State; an ithers wha are no born tae be philosophers, an are meant tae be followers rather nor leaders.

Then noo for a definition, he said.

Follae me, I said, an I hope that I may in some wey or anither be able tae gie ye a satisfactory explanation.

Proceed.

I daur say that ye mind, an therefore I neednae mind ye, that a lover, if he is worthy o the name, ocht tae shaw his love, no tae some yin pairt o that whilk he loves, but tae the hale thing.

I really dinnae understand, an therefore beg o ye tae assist my memory.

Anither person, I said, micht fairly reply as ye dae; but a man o pleasure like yersel ocht tae ken that aw wha are in the prime o youth dae somehow or anither raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, an are thocht bi him tae be worthy o his affectionate regards. Isna this a wey whilk ye hae wi the fair fowk: yin has a wee stubby neb, an ye praise her charmin face; the hooked neb o anither has, ye say, a royal look; while he wha is neither snub nor hooked has the grace o regularity: the dreich face is manly, the fair are bairns o the gods; an as tae the sweet 'honey pale,' as they are cried, whit is the very name but the invention o a lover wha talks in diminutives, an is no averse tae paleness if appearin on the cheek o youth? In a word, there is nae excuse whilk ye winnae mak, an naething whilk ye winnae say, in order no tae lose a single flooer that blooms in the spring-time o youth.

If ye mak me an authority in matters o love, for the sake o the argument, I agree.

An whit dae ye say o lovers o wine? Disnae ye see them doin the same? They are gled o any excuse o drinkin ony wine.

Very guid.

An the same is true o ambitious men; if they canna command an army, they are willin tae command a wee squad; an if they canna be honoured bi really important an graund fowk, they are gled tae be honoured bi lesser an meaner fowk, but honour o some kind they maun hae.

Exactly.

Ance mair lat me ask: Dis he wha desires ony kynd o guid, desire the hale kynd or juist a pairt?

The hale.

An micht we no say o the philosopher that he is a lover, no juist o a bit o wisdom but o the hail thing?

Aye, o the hail thing.

An he wha disnae like learnin, especially in youth, whan he has nae pouer o judgin whit is guid an whit isnae, sic an ane we maintain no tae be a philosopher or a lover o knawledge, juist as he wha refuses his food isnae hungry, an micht be said tae hae a bad appetite an no a guid yin?

Very true, he said.

Whereas he wha has a taste for every sort o knawledge an wha is curious tae learn an is niver satisfied, micht be justly cried a philosopher? Am I no richt?

Glaucon said: If curiosity maks a philosopher, ye will find mony a strange bein will hae a richt tae the name. Aw the lovers o sichts hae a delicht in learnin, an maun therefore be includit. Muisical fancy-folk, an aa, are fowk strangely oot o place amang philosophers, for they are the last fowk in the warld wha wid come tae onything like a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they rin aboot at the Dionysian festivals as if they had let oot their lugs tae hear every chorus; whether the performance is in toon or kintra --that maks nae difference --they are there. Noo are we tae maintain that aw thir an ony wha hae similar tastes, as weel as the professors o quite minor airts, are philosophers?

Certainly no, I replied; they are only an imitation.

He said: Wha then are the true philosophers?

Those, I said, wha are lovers o the sicht o truth.

That is also guid, he said; but I wid like tae ken whit ye mean?

Tae anither, I replied, I micht hae a difficulty in explainin; but I am sure that ye will admit a proposition whilk I am about tae mak.

What is the proposition?

That since beauty is the opposite o ugliness, they are twa?

Certainly.

An inasmuch as they are twa, each o them is yin?

True again.

An o juist an unjust, guid an evil, an o every ither class, the same remark hauds: taen singly, each o them yin; but frae the various combinations o them wi actions an things an wi yin anither, they are seen in aw sorts o lichts an appear mony? Very true.

An this is the distinction whilk I draw atween the sicht-lovin, airt-lovin, practical class an those o wha I am speakin, an wha are alane worthy o the name o philosophers.

Hoo dae ye distinguish them? he said.

The lovers o sounds an sichts, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond o fine tones an colours an forms an aw the man-made things that are made oot o them, but their mind is incapable o seein or lovin absolute beauty.

True, he replied.

Few are they wha are able tae reach the sicht o this.

Very true.

An he wha, havin a sense o bonnie things has nae sense o absolute beauty, or wha, if anither leads him tae a kennin o that beauty is unable tae follae -- o sic an ane I ask, Is he wauken or in a dream anerly? Think on it: isnae the dreamer, sleepin or wauken, yin wha likens dissimilar things, wha pits the copy in the steid o the real object?

I sud certainly say that sic an ane wis dreamin.

But tak the case o the ither, wha recognises the existence o absolute beauty an is able tae distinguish the idea frae the objects whilk participate in the idea, naeither pittin the objects in the steid o the idea nor the idea in the steid o the objects -- is he a dreamer, or is he wauken?

He is wide awake.

An micht we no say that the mind o the yin wha kens has knowledge, an that the mind o the ither, wha opines only, has opinion?

Certainly.

But suppose that the latter sud argue wi us an dispute oor statement, can we administer ony soothin cordial or advice tae him, withoot revealin tae him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

We maun certainly offer him some guid advice, he replied.

Come then, an lat us think o somethin tae say tae him. Shall we begin bi assurin him that he is welcome tae ony knowledge whilk he may hae, an that we are rejoiced at his havin it? But we wid like tae ask him a question: Dis he wha has knowledge ken somethin or naething? (Ye maun answer for him.)

I answer that he kens somethin.

Something that is or isnae?

Something that is; for hoo can that whilk isnae ever be kent?

An are we assured, efter leukin at the maitter frae mony points o view, that absolute bein is or may be absolutely kent, but that the utterly non-existent is utterly unknown?

Naething can be mair certain.

Guid. But if there be onything whilk is o sic a nature as tae be an no tae be, that will hae a place intermediate atween pure bein an the absolute negation o bein?

Aye, atween them.

An, as knowledge corresponded tae bein an ignorance o necessity tae no-bein, for that intermediate atween bein an no-bein there has tae be discovered a corresponding intermediate atween ignorance an knowledge, if there be sic?

Certainly.

Dae we admit the existence o opinion?

Undoubtedly.

As bein the same wi knowledge, or anither faculty?

Anither faculty.

Then opinion an knowledge hae tae dae wi different k�nds o maitter correspondin tae this difference o faculties?

Aye.

An knowledge is relative tae bein an kens bein. But afore I proceed forder I will mak a division.

Whit division?

I will begin bi pittin faculties in a class bi themsels: they are pouers in us, an in aw ither things, bi whilk we dae as we dae. Sichts an hearin, for example, I sud caa faculties. Hae I clearly explained the kynd whilk I mean?

Aye, I quite understaun.

Then lat me tell ye ma view aboot them. I dinnae see them, an therefore the distinctions o fire, colour, an the like, whilk enable me tae discern the differences o some things, dinnae apply tae them. In speakin o a faculty I think only o its sphere an its result; an that whilk has the same sphere an the same result I caa the same faculty, but that whilk has anither sphere an anither result I caa different. Wid that be yer wey o speakin?

Aye.

An will ye be so verra guid as tae answer yin mair question? Wid ye say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class wid ye pit it?

Certainly knowledge is a faculty, an the mightiest o aw faculties.

An opinion - shall we pit it in a different class than faculty? 

Nae wey, for that by whilk we are able tae hae an opinion is naething else but the faculty o opinion.

But nae lang syne ye agreed that science an opinion are no the same thing. 

Hoo could ony reasonable body say that somethin infallibly true is the same as somethin that can be wrang? 

Excellent, an we clearly agree that opinion is a different thing fae scientific knowledge. 

Aye, different.

Ilka yin o them then, since it has a different pouer, is relatit tae a different object. 

That's for sure. 

Science, I assume, is relatit tae that which is, tae ken the condition o that which exists. But opinion, we say, forms opinions. 

Aye.

Dis it hae opinions aboot the same thing that science kens, an will the thing that can be kent an the thing that can be opined aboot be identical, or is that impossible?

Impossible bi oor admissions.

If different faculties are naturally relatit tae different objects an baith opinion an science are faculties, but each different fae the ither, as we say - these admissions dinnae leave room for the thing that can be kent an the thing that can be opined aboot tae be the same.

Then, if that which is can be kent, something ither than that which is must be the thing that can be opined aboot. 

Something else.

Dis it hae opinions aboot that which isnae, or is it impossible even tae hae an opinion aboot that which isnae? Think on it: Disnae he wha forms an opinion dae sae aboot something or shall we contradict oorsels an say that it's possible tae hae an opinion, yet hae an opinion aboot naething?

That's impossible. 

Then someone who forms an opinion must hae an opinion aboot something. 

Aye.

But surely that which doesnae exist couldnae be considered as some specific thing, but mair accurately as naething at all. Tae that which doesnae exist we necessarily assigned nae-kennin, an tae that which exists, knowledge.

Richtly.

Then neither that which exists nor that which doesnae exist is the subject o opinion. 

It seems no.

Then opinion wid be neither nae-kennin nor knowledge. 

So it seems.

Is it then a faculty ootside o these, surpassin either knowledge in brichtness or ignorance in darkness? 

It is neither.

But dae ye consider opinion something dimmer than knowledge but brighter than ignorance? 

Much so," he said. "An dis it lie within the borders o the twa? 

Aye.

Then opinion wid be atween the twa. 

Absolutely.

Did we no say a wee while syne that if somethin wis tae appear that baith is an isnae, that kind o thing wid lie atween that which purely an absolutely exists an that which doesnae exist, an that the faculty that corresponds wi it wid be neither science nor nae-kennin, but that which should seem tae haud a place correspondinly atween nae-kennin an science?

Right.

An noo there has turned up atween these twa the thing that we cry opinion. 

There has.

It wid seem then, that we need tae discover something that partakes o baith bein an no bein, an that couldnae be properly cried bi either name on its ain; sae that, if it is discovered, we micht juistly say it's the thing that can be opined aboot, thus linkin extremes tae extremes an the middle tae the middle. Is that no richt?

It is.

Wi this much agreed upon, lat me tell him, lat him answer me, that chiel who doesnae think there is a bonnie thing in itself or ony idea o beauty in itself that aye stays the same an unchanged, but who believes in mony bonnie things - the lover o spectacles, I mean, wha cannae bide tae hear onybody say that the bonnie is yin an the juist yin, an sae o ither things - an this will be oor question: Ma guid chiel, is there ony yin o these mony fair-an-honourable things that winnae sometimes seem ugly an base? An o the juist things, that winnae seem unjust? An o the pious things, that winnae seem impious? 

Nae, it's inevitable that they did appear tae be baith bonnie in a wey an ugly, an sae wi aw the ither things ye askit aboot.

An again, dae the mony dooble things seem ony less like halves nor do!? 

None the less.

An likewise o the great an the wee things, the licht an the hivy things - will they alloo these descriptions ony mair nor their opposites? 

Na, ilk o them will aye haud o, partake o, baith.

Then is each o these mair o what yin says it is than it isnae?

They're like thae jesters wha play tricks wi us in a dooble sense at banquets, an resemble the bairns' riddle aboot the eunuch an his hittin o the bat - wi whit an as it sat on whit they signify that he struck it. For thir things an aa play word games, an it's impossible tae think clearly aboot ony yin o them tae be or no tae be or baith or neither.

Dae ye ken whit tae dae wi them then? an can ye find a better place tae pit them than that midway atween bein or essence an the no-tae-be? For we surely winnae discover a darker region than no-bein that they should still mair no be, nor brichter than bein that they should still mair be.

Absolutely true. It seems then that we've discovered that the mony conventions o the mony aboot whit is fair an honourable an ither things are tossed aboot in the middle region atween that which isnae an that which is in the true an absolute sense. 

We have so found it.

But we agreed aforehaund that, if onything o that sort wis tae be discovered, it hid tae be cried opinable, no something that can be kent, the wanderer atween bein, caught bi the faculty that is something in-between. 

We did agree.

We shall say then, that those wha see mony bonnie things but dinnae see the bonnie thing itself an are unable tae follae anither's guidance tae it, an mony juist things, but no juistice itself, an sae in aw cases - we shall say that sic fowk hae opinions aboot aw things, but ken naething o the things they opine aboot. 

Absolutely.

An, on the ither haund, whit o those wha contemplate the very things themselves in ilk case, aye stayin the same an unchanged - shall we no say that they ken an dinnae jist opine? 

That, too, necessarily follows.

Shall we no say an aa that the yin welcomes tae his thocht an loves the things subject tae knowledge an the ither those tae opinion? Dinnae we mind that we said that those loved an regarded tones an bonnie colours an the like, but they couldnae bide the notion o the reality o the bonnie itself? 

We dae mind.

Shall we then offend their lugs if we cry them lovers o beliefs rather than philosophers an will they be gey angry if we speak sae?

No, if they heed ma counsel, for tae be angry wi truth isnae lawful.

Then tae those wha in ilka kind welcome the true bein, lovers o wisdom an no lovers o opinion is the name we maun gie. 

Absolutely.

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